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INTRODUCTION 
On 21 August 1939, the Nazi-Soviet Pact was disclosed. On 23 August 
Prime Minister Mackenzie King announced that Parliament would be 
called into session at once if efforts to prevent the immediate outbreak of 
war were to fail.' 
Two days later. King's Minister of Justice, Ernest Lapointe, received 
a letter from the Commissioner of the RCMP, S.T. Wood, outlining the 
state of war readiness of Canada's national police force and internal 
security agency. The Mounties reported that they had prepared lists of "all 
known potential enemy aliens" and of all espionage suspects: these could 
be anested "at a moment's notice" once the word was given. "Suspects 
of lesser importance" were to kept imder surveillance. A registry of enemy 
aliens would be supplied with information from the RCMP files. Although 
concerned with fascists and Nazis (and Ukrainian nationalists sympa-
thethic toward the Hitler regime), the RCMP also anticipated a "more rigid 
and extended surveillance of Communist Agitators, particularly those ac-
tive among industrial workers" and recommended the outlawing of the 
Communist party by Order in Council under the War Measures Act. The 
Commissioner also spoke of close co-ordination between the RCMP, 
military intelligence, External Affairs, and the departments of transport, 
justice, and immigration, and added that "liaison is being maintained in 
all matters of mutual interest with M.I.5, London, England."^ 
Canada was just days away from entering a global conflict for which 
it was ill-prepared in almost every way except one. The economy, bat-
tered by a decade of depression, was hardly in a promising state to wage 
war. Military preparations were, according to the official historian of the 
Canadian Army, "utterly inadequate by comparison with the scale of the 
coming emergency."' Nor did Canada have any external intelligence 
capacity of its own, apart from scraps gathered by its small number of 
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diplomatic representatives abroad. For foreign intelligence Canada was 
dependent upon Britain's Foreign Office and its Secret Intelligence Ser-
vice, or M.I.6. During the war, Canada would carve out a small, if sub-
ordinate, role in signals intelligence gathering,* and would host the 
celebrated (and rather over-romanticized) Camp X for training secret 
agents.' But this was small potatoes in what Sir Winston Churchill called 
the "wizard war" of espionage and codcbreaking. In only one area was 
the Canadian state ready for war—internal surveillance and control. For-
eign enemies would await national mobilization and conversion of the 
economy to war production. The Canadian state was, on the other hand, 
well prepared for the enemy within. 
There was some question, however, regarding the identity of this 
enemy within. Pro-Nazis and pro-Fascists would seem to be the obvious 
candidates in a war against the Axis powers. There were such groups in 
Canada, a few homegrown and others rooted in the German and Italian 
communities. There was general suspicion among Canadians regarding 
the German and Italian ethnic communities (justified or unjustified) and 
later in the war, outright racism would engulf the Japanese-Canadian 
population of British Columbia. Yet in the late 1930s, with fascist armies 
on the rise in Europe, it took the specific urging of Norman Robertson, a 
senior civil servant, to draw the close attention of the RCMP to pro-fas-
cist activities.* Charles Rivett-Camac, head of the RCMP's Intelligence 
Branch, tried to assiu"e Robertson in early 1939 that fascism was much 
less of a threat than Communism since the former guaranteed at least a 
"modified form of capitalism."' The official historian of the RCMP has 
recently written that the Communists were the "principal target of RCMP 
intelligence" in the interwar years, while at the end of the 1930s pro-fas-
cist groups became a "secondary objective."* 
The weight of state repression did fall most heavily on those judged to 
be sympathetic to Canada's enemies.' Yet to the RCMP and to many 
prominent civiUan officials in both Ottawa and the provincial capitals, it 
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was obvious that Communism was the permanent and enduring enemy 
within. The Nazi-Soviet pact and the opposition of the Communist party 
to the "imperialist" war (which lasted until precisely 22 June 1941, tl^ 
day the Nazi armies pour^ over the Soviet borders), offered valid grounds 
for targeting the Communists under the Defence of Canada Regulations. 
They also offwed a pretext for intensified intrusive surveillance which the 
RCMP was eagCT to grasp. 
The Intelligence Section of the RCMP was, on the eve of the war, run 
by a tiny six-man headquarters attached to the Criminal Investigation 
Branch. Yet despite its small numbers, its agents and sources had deeply 
penetrated the Canadian Communist party. One of its stalwarts was John 
Leopold who, as undercover agent "Jack Esselwein," had successfully 
played a prominent Communist agitator in the 1920s before making a 
dramatic appearance as a Crown wimess in the case of Rex v. Buck et al, 
the 1931 prosecution of party leaders under Section 98 of the Criminal 
Code. Clearly one of the reasons for its relative success in Red-hunting 
was that it had marshalled its resources and limited its targets. War against 
Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy provided it with opportunities hitherto 
undreamed of. By 1943 the headquarters staff of the Intelligence Section 
had risen to 98 and in the field there was a sharp increase in personnel: 20 
in Toronto, 19 in Montreal, 9 in Vancouver, for example.'" It seems to 
have acted competently in counter-espionage operations against the ene-
my, but Canada was far away from the centre of hostilities and unlikely 
to be a major target for Axis espionage. The main thrust of RCMP ac-
tivities was mounted against the enemy within, and here the RCMP itself 
took a strong role in defining the tasks of security and intelligence. 
The RCMP was represented on a high-level, top-secret committee of 
civil servants which mapped out plans for wartime emergency powers 
before hostilities actually began. Thus the police were able to contribute 
directly to the shaping of the laws and regulations they were later to en-
force." The Commissioner was appointed Registrar General of Enemy 
Aliens, responsible for registration of tens of thousands of Germans, 
Italians, and Japanese. Rounding up and interrogation of internees was a 
major task, as was the investigation of complaints from citizens regard-
ing possible espionage or subversion cases. Guarding sites judged impor-
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tant to the war effort and countering potential sabotage to war production 
made great demands on time and resources. When regular police work 
within the national jurisdiction (much expanded in wartime under the War 
Measures Act), and the Mounties' role as provincial police in most provin-
ces, excluding only Quebec and Ontario, are taken into account, it is ap-
parent that the RCMP had a major role to play in wartime Canada. 
The Intelligence Bulletin, produced within the Intelligence Section and 
circulated to the Prime Minister's office and to the senior levels of federal 
departments, offers an invaluable insight into RCMP thinking on its rapid-
ly expanding security and intelhgence role. Intelligence gathering is an 
activity which requires a certain degree of analytical skill in interpreta-
tion and preparation of a finished intelligence product for its consumers— 
the latter being the senior RCMP brass and the government of Canada. 
Criminal investigation may not necessarily induce analytical reflection 
upon its practicioners, and certainly not literary expression. But intel-
ligence work does lead in this direction. It is perhaps no accident that In-
spector Charles Rivett-Camac, head of the Intelligence Section, was also 
the editor of the RCMP Quarterly, and subsequently a pubUshed author 
following his retirement The Intelligence Bulletins offer an insight into 
the RCMP mind as well as into the kind of intelligence they were pursu-
ing in wartime Canada: who and what was considered dangerous and why. 
Not everyone in official Ottawa in the select circle which received the 
Bulletins was impressed by their contents, or by the RCMP's concept of 
intelligence. Harry Ferns was serving as a young official in Mackenzie 
King's office in the spring of 1940 when he came up against the face of 
Canadian intelligence. As Ferns later recollected:'̂  
Political intelligence in the Canadian government was characterized by bone-
headed stupridity. I was not alone in this opinion. A few weeks after I entered the 
Prime Minister's Office, an RCMP constable came to my room bearing a large 
brown envelope marked SECRET. He saluted and asked me to sign a receipt. This 
I did. With some awe I carried the envelope to Pickersgill" and asked him what 
to do with this. Jack gave one of his loud guffaws, waved his hand with a flourish 
and said, 'That's the Perils of Pauline. Throw it in the file, but read it if you want 
a laugh." 
I went back to my room and opened the envelofje. Inside was another envelope 
together with a receipt returnable to the RCMP attesting to the fact that I was about 
to open the second envelope. Inside this envelope I foimd a mimeographed 
pamphlet boimd in a green cover bearing the arms of the RCMP. About 80 per 
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cent of die items were extracts from Canadian newspapers concerning the move-
ments and utterances of Communists, supposed Commimists, and various trade 
union officials. Some of the items I had already seen among the daily circulation 
of the Prime Minister's clipping service. There were a few items on various priests 
atxl pacifists, and nothing at all about various splinter groups in Quebec opposed 
to Canada's entry into the war. It was something of amystery to me how the RCMP 
ever found the home-grown Fuhrer, Adrien Arcand, let alone arrested him. After 
reading this intelligence bulletin a few times I began to follow Pickersgill's ad-
vice. I simply "threw it in the file." 
Ferns goes on to note that the discovery of Soviet espionage in war-
time Ottawa came not through the counter-espionage activities of the 
RCMP but through the defection of the Soviet cypher clerk, Igor Gou-
zenko in 1945. The RCMP, he suggests, were instead "taught to see Com-
munists at woik wherever men and women assembled to talk about civil 
rights, trade union problems, povoty and peace." Ferns was not an entire-
ly neutral observer. He had himself become a Communist while studying 
at Cambridge in the 1930s amidst that famous generation of CamMdge 
Communists. He maintains that his party ties had dropped away before he 
took up his duties in the PMO, but he retained a certain distance from 
some of the conservative shibboleths of official Ottawa. Indeed, he was 
later driven out of the civil service and later yet out of Canada for his al-
leged left-wing sympathies.'* But his doubts about RCMP "intelligence" 
were shared by others in the PMO. 
Jack Pickersgill had prepared an analysis of the Intelligence Bulletin 
for the Prime Minister in late November 1939. This was passed on to King 
a year later by James A. Gibson, another PMO official, with approval.'* 
Pickersgill noted that in wartime, "the detection of espionage, of plans for 
sabotage, and of subversive activities is the most important aspect of in-
telligence work in connection with the maintenance of internal security." 
Such work was "presumably divided" between the RCMP and military 
intelligence. The latter reported no information to the Prime Minister. The 
RCMP on the other hand reported regulariy through the Intelligence Bul-
letin. Pickersgill's analysis of a single issue of the Bulletin (30 October 
These difficulties are recounted at length in Reading From Left to Right. Some 
of the problem seems to have stemmed from an alleged mention in one of the docu-
ments that Gouzenko stole from the Soviet Embassy: this turns out to be an ab-
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1939—'War Series No.2') revealed a number of serious deficiencies: 
(1) an inability to distinguish between 'facts' and 'hearsay'; 
(2) an ' anti-Red complex ' which has a striking resemblance to that of the notorious 
Dies Committee'* in the United States, with the same tendency to label labour or-
ganizers, mild radicals, etc., as Communists. It may be noted, for example, that a 
French Canadian Liberal candidate in a recent provincial by-election was de-
scribed in one of the Bulletins (not the one analysed) as a member of a Communist-
controlled organization; 
(3) no discrimination between legitimate social and fwUtical criticism and subver-
sive doctrine; 
(4) an almost exclusive pre-occupation with so-called subversive organizations, 
and, even in this field, very little information about Nazis or Fascists; 
(5) no evidence of any suspected sabotage or espionage; 
(6) no suggestion that there is any co-ordination with the Military Intelhgence, or 
with the Immigration authorities, or with the Department of External Affairs, or 
even with the Censorship. 
It is evident that the police are attending and rejxirting on often completely harm-
less meetings, and spying on the daily activities of peaceful and law-abiding 
citizens. In itself this may not be very serious, although it would seem to be un-
desirable in a free country. It is, however, somewhat disturbing to discover that 
the police are setting themselves up as self-appointed censors of political opinion 
in the Community, especially when they regard the mildest expressions of liberal 
views as evidence of Communism. 
What is more disturbing is the evidence of a total lack of capacity, education and 
training required for real intelligence work, and a failure to appreciate the direc-
tion from which serious danger may threaten us. 
It may well be that there are Communists in Canada who are engaged in espionage 
or in planning sabotage, but they will jjresumably be working secreüy and will 
obviously not be among the so-called "agitators" who are sufficiently well-known. 
It is more likely that there are secret German agents in the country....From a casual 
reading of these "Intelligence Bulletins" one would scarcely realize that Canada 
was at war with Germany; there is not the slightest hint that anything is being done 
in the way of intelligent and well-directed "anti-espionage" work. 
Pickersgill went on to suggest greater co-ordination and liaison be-
tween various government agencies with an interest in aspects of intel-
ligence and security under the overall direction of an Intelligence Branch 
located in the Department of Justice, to which the RCMP would report. 
The civilian Director of Intelhgence, "with an adequate conception of the 
real function of intelligence work in war-time, could probably direct the 
energies of the police into channels which would enable them to con-
tribute effectively to our inlemal security without creating public uneasi-
The House Committee on Un-American Activities which under the chairman-
ship of Congressman Martin Dies of Texas investigated Communism in America 
in the late 1930s with scant attention to fact but a sharp eye for headlines. 
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ness about die development of a police-state.*'̂ '' 
In his analysis of the October 301939 Bulletin, PickersgiU pointed out 
specific examples of the kind of ixt>blem to which he was alluding. For 
instance, its item on the Russian-language Communist organ Kanadsky 
Gudok refers to "seditious attacks." "To illustrate these seditious articles," 
Pickersgill notes, "a paragraph is quoted criticizing the Chamberlain 
government in toms which, to say the least, would not be considered out-
side the limits of legitimate criticism in Englaitd." Indeed, Britain was 
often cited by lib^al Canadian officials as an example of relative tol-
erance of dissent, despite the close proximity of Britain to the Nazi 
threat.'* Canada, far from the direct threat of invasion, was apparentiy 
more jittery. The RCMP expressed a mood which had far wider roots than 
the police alone. Indeed, despite the existence of some critics with liberal 
reservations within the government, and despite the private expressions 
in his diary of Mackenzie King's liberal conscience, the King government 
in general and the Justice Department in particular, strongly supported the 
Mounties." 
The obsession with Communism, evident from the pages of the Bul-
letin in these years, was only tenuously related to the CP's anti-war 
propaganda during the life of the Nazi-Soviet pact. That inx>paganda was, 
in any event, pretty marginal and unimportant—as is evident from what 
the best effwts of tiie RCMP were able to uncover as revealed in the Bul-
letin. Although the Mounties had warned in the very first issue of the 
Bulletin's War Series [23 October 1939] that "we are of the opinion that 
there is more to fear from acts of espionage and sabotage on the part of 
the Communist Party than from Nazi or fascist organizations and ad-
herents," no evidence of sabotage was ever adduced, and the espionage 
on behalf of the USSR revealed in 1945 by Igor Gouzenko did not seem 
to have been initiated until the arrival of a Soviet mission in Ottawa in 
1942. 
In February 1941, the Commissioner of the RCMP, S.T. Wood, went 
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public with the anti-Communist message. In The Canadian Spokesman, 
under the title 'TOOLS FOR TREACHERY'. Wood confided to his 
readers that 
many may be surprised to hear that it is not the Nazi nor the Fascist but the radi-
cal who constitutes our most troublesome jwoblem. Whereas the enemy alien is 
usually recognizable artd easily rendered innocuous by clear-cut laws applicable 
to his case, your 'Red* has the protection of citizenship, his foreign master is not 
officially an enemy and, unless he blunders into the open and provides proof of 
his guilt, he is much more difficult to supfjress... Alost of his work is carried on 
under cova of other organizations and associations pretending to be, or in reality, 
loyal to the Constitution. 
Wood cited, as examples of such witting or unwitting fronts: labour 
unions, groups of the unemployed, the "criminal and weakminded clas-
ses," youth clubs, civil liberties associations, dupes in the press who 
criticized government policies, and even "a few parliamentarians, who 
are ^jparently sincere but obviously un-informed or indifferent to facts" 
who were "greatly encouraging the subversive elements by attacking the 
Defence [of Canada] Regulations."^ 
This diatribe roused the ire of the leader of the CCF, M.J. Coldwell. 
Coldwell's question in the House of Commons came to the attention of 
Pickersgill in Mackenzie King's office. The latter passed on a copy of the 
article to the Prime Minister with a handwritten note attached: "It seems 
to reveal the same kind of attitude which the Nazis fostered so success-
fully with ûit Anti-Comintern Pact, and which did so much to weaken the 
morale of France."^ King's reaction is not recorded, but there is no 
evidence that Wood was chastised. 
After 22 June 1941 the Communists did a sharp U-turn and became in-
stant enthusiasts for a total war effort of the democracies against fascism. 
The RCMP could not care less. The Bulletin for 16 August 1941 [War 
Series No. 46] had this to say: 
Until Germany invaded Russia Canadian Communists were the relentless enemies 
of democracy and of anything that made for its defence. Now, because the Father-
land of Communism is in deadly peril, they deign to join forces with us against 
the common enemy—until the enemy is destroyed. Thay have turned their coats 
but not their hearts and their hatred of democracy bums as fiercely as ever. Should 
their intemed leaders be freed again to stab us in the back? 
The question was obviously rhetorical. And indeed the intemed 
The Canadian Spokesman: the Magazine on National Affairs, 1:2 (February 
1941), 1-6. 
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"leaders" [sic—the leaders had gone into hiding, it was mostly lower level 
party operatives who ended up in jail], remained interned in many cases 
fOT almost a year after the USSR had become an ally.^ Moreover, the 
Communist party remained illegal throughout the duration of the war on 
the advice of the RCMP (as well as the Catholic church and the Quebec 
Liboal caucus). Canada was thus the only Western ally to maintain a ban 
on the local CP during the era of the Soviet alliance. A conveniwt fiction 
was worked out whereby the party was recreated as the Labour Progres-
sive Party which could legally nm candidates and its banned newspaper 
resurfaced as the Tribune. This peculiar protocol was necessary to appease 
the diehard (^)ponents of Communism who savoured their symbolic, if 
not substantive, relegation of the party to illegality. 
Yet once the USSR had become an ally, and once Mackenzie King 
began appearing before Canadian Aid to Russia rallies v/here rousing ren-
ditions of the Internationale and God Save the King opened proceedings, 
the diehard anti-Communism of the RCMP was bound to wear thin in the 
eyes of many officials. It even became embarrassing when the Com-
munists in the unions began volunteering no strike pledges on behalf of 
war production, and such old Red-baiters as Ontario premier Mitch Hep-
bum started turning up on platforms beside prominent Communists to 
preach the virtues of a total war effort. By 1942, the Prime Minister's Prin-
cipal Secretary, WJ. Tumbull, was complaining to his boss about the 
Mounties still engaging in "'red' hunting." "Apparenüy there are in 
the...Mounted Police, some men like the notorious Sergeant Leopold, 
whose jobs would seem to depend on continuing to uncover bolshevik 
plots. They may have some grounds for their suspicions, but I would think 
that a change of policy might well be indicated to them, with Russia a 
valiant ally."^ 
It may have been the attitudes of prime ministerial advisers like 
Tumbull and Pickersgill, given a strong boost by the international situa-
tion, which led to a sudden change of policy with regard to the circulation 
of the Intelligence Bulletins. At the end of 1941, all distribution beyond 
the RCMP security service itself came to a halt. Moreover, Mounties came 
around to offices where the Bulletin had previously been transmitted and 
removed all earlier editions dating back to the beginning of the war. Since 
documentary evidence is lacking on this decision, it remains unclear just 
what was behind it Probably the government no longer found the regular 
anti-Communist litany of much interest. The Mounties went back to talk-
ing to themselves—if indeed, given the earlier testimony of Harry Ferns, 
See William and Kathleen Repka, Dangerous Patriots: Canada's Unknown 
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the Bulletin had ever actually had much of an external readership. Intel-
ligence is a product to be consumed, normally by the governments that 
employ intelligence agencies. The RCMP Intelligence Bulletin was a 
product consumed in-house. 
Are these Bulletins then worth our attention almost a half century later, 
if the government of the day could scarcely be bothered to consult them? 
There are strong arguments for republishing them today—perhaps, ironi-
cally, for the very reasons that critics rejected them in the early war years. 
The Bulletins provide us with a considerable amount of information 
on the very subject that the government of the day was growing tired of 
hearing about: Communism and Communist activities in various sectors 
of Canadian life. Not only is party activity, as such, chronicled, but trade 
unions and other organizations are surveyed as they relate, or allegedly 
relate, to Communist penetration. Particularly valuable as source material 
are RCMP studies of various ethnic organizations in Canada, including 
material which has never been in print (at least in English) before. The 
Mounties maintained sources in some of these organizations; their reports 
thus constitute first-hand accounts of the politics of ethnic communities. 
Pro-fascist activités were being reported upon, even though Communism 
held iMide of place. 
There are also int^esting insights to be gained into the outlook of the 
RCMP: that, for instance, the force did not approve of free-lance vigilante 
groups attacking alleged "fifth-column" traitors [10 June 1940—^War 
Series No.33], and that it preferred to see anti-alien hysteria in the popula-
tion die down, rather than fan the flames. In Canada, questions of subver-
sion and treason were to be dealt with by the accredited authorities of the 
state, not by unofficial entrejreneurs. In the United States, J. Edgar 
Hoover's FBI was happy to feed Congressional and private witch-hunters 
with material from the Bureau's files. This tendency, later to grow into 
McCarthyism by the early 1950s, was not at all to the taste or inclination 
of the RCMP. As is evident from a number of items in these Bulletins, the 
Mounties were not averse to quoting approvingly from the findings of the 
demagogic House Committee on Un-American Activities. But they would 
not have welcomed a Canadian equivalent. Such a body would itself have 
been rather un-Canadian. 
The Bulletins which are reproduced here represent a very early use of the 
Access to Information Act. In 1983, shortly after the Act came into force, 
I directed a request to the RCMP for specific numbers of the Bulletins 
from October 1939 through December 1941. In the course of research I 
had come across a notation in the records of the External Affairs Depart-
ment that in December of 1941 a representative of the Mounties had 
removed the War Series Bulletins which had been transmitted to Üie 
Department. The Bulletins taken away were itemized by date. 1 could thus 
INTRODUCTION 19 
make my request very specific. After paying $164.00 for photocopying 
charges, I received copies of the Bulletins early in 1984. 
Numerous deletions had been made on the texts, but complaints to the 
Infcnnation Commissioner (as provided for by the Act) were of no assis-
tance. Among the complaints I raised were that material was exempted 
on the grounds of s. 19(1) of the Act regarding personal information, even 
though the docimients veK some 40 years old and dealt with persons al-
ready of mature years. Presumably most would now be dead, and a good 
many dead for the 20 years or more required under the Act for the release 
of personal information. The response of the Commissioner to this point 
was that neither her office nor the RCM? {sic\) "have the capacity to as-
certain the status of each individual mentioned in the documents." She 
went on: "If you believe that a given person might be mentioned in an ex-
empted portion, and that that person died over 20 years ago, please let us 
have the details and we will check the record."^ The catch-22 in this, of 
course, is that when names are removed, how can one possibly prove that 
these phantom jwesences died 20 years ago or more? Similarly, my at-
tempts to draw attention to the RCMP's apparent failure to apply the "in-
jury test" clauses of the exemption sections they had invoked—s. 15(1) 
speaks of material which could "reasonably be expected to be injurious 
to...." and s.l6(l)(c) uses the same language—failed to impress or inter-
est the Commissioner, who declined to press any of my complaints, ex-
cept for one technical one. 
In regard to the deletions in the text, the Pickersgill analysis of the 30 
October 1939 Bulletin [War Series No. 2], includes a summary of the con-
tents of each item. In the text released to me by the RCMP, three items 
have been removed. The headings in the table of contents have also been 
removed so that the reader has no idea even of the subject matter (which 
of course makes it difficult to make a case against the exemption). In the 
Pickersgill summary, the three missing items are described as follows:^ 
There follows a report that a member of the Communist party has got a job as or-
ganizer with the Hosiery Workers Union in Hamilton. The next item reports the 
dismissal of the business manager of the Daily Clarion of Toronto for opposing 
the policy of the Communist party. 
The next item records the resignation of the Mayor of Blairmore, Alberta, from 
the Communist party. In comment on the resignation, the report reads, "Whether 
this individual has an ulterior motive underlying his announcement, is not known 
as yet" 
Readers may draw their own conclusions regarding the injury to the 
national interest or to the privacy of these individuals that would have 
been involved by the disclosure of these items 45 years after the event. It 
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may also be confidently assumed that much of the remaining exempted 
material falls into the same category. 
At the end of 1987, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, which 
since the passage of the CSIS Act in 1984 now houses the historical 
records of the RCMP security service, gave unrestricted permission to the 
Committee on Labour History to publish the Bulletins which Professor 
Gregory Kealey and myself had had released under various Access to In-
formation requests. Under different names and formats, these declassified 
Bulletins run from December 1919 through December 1955. We plan to 
publish all of them in successive volumes, of which this present series is 
one. 
R.W. 
